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Abstract
OBJECTIVE—To find the source of tuberculin skin test conversions among 38 hospital 
employees on 1 floor during routine testing January–February 2010.
METHODS—Record review of patients at a private hospital during September–December 2009 
and interviews with hospital employees. Names of patients from the state tuberculosis (TB) 
registry were cross-referenced with hospital records for admissions. Mycobacterium tuberculosis 
genotype results in the county and adjacent counties were examined, and contacts were evaluated 
for TB infection and disease.
RESULTS—One of the 38 employees, a nurse, was diagnosed with pulmonary TB with a 
matching M. tuberculosis genotype and drug resistance pattern (isoniazid monoresistant) to those 
of a county jail inmate also recently diagnosed with pulmonary TB. The nurse had no known 
contact with that inmate; however, another inmate in his 20’s from the same jail had been 
hospitalized under that nurse’s care in October 2009. That young man died, and a postmortem 
examination result subsequently confirmed TB, which had not been suspected. Exposure to this 
man with undiagnosed TB could explain the transmission: 87 (27%) of the 318 hospital-based 
contacts without previous positive tuberculin skin test results were infected, and 9 contacts had 
active TB.
CONCLUSIONS—This investigation demonstrated M. tuberculosis transmission in a hospital 
due to a missed diagnosis and nonadherence to national TB infection control guidelines. Routine 
TB screening of employees allowed early detection of this missed TB diagnosis, facilitating 
prompt evaluation of contacts. Healthcare providers should suspect TB in symptomatic persons 
and adhere to TB control policies.
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During January–February 2010, a hospital found 38 employees with tuberculin skin test 
(TST) conversions within 6 months of having a negative TST result. Most of the 38 
employees worked on the same medical-surgical floor. TST conversion is a sign of recent 
infection with Mycobacterium tuberculosis, which is associated with an increased risk for 
progression to tuberculosis (TB) disease.1 No employee at this hospital had been found to 
have a TST conversion during the preceding 2 years.
Such a large number of recently positive TST results within 2 months, with no known 
explanation, was cause for alarm. This report describes a missed diagnosis of TB that 
resulted in transmission of M. tuberculosis in a hospital.
METHODS
Setting
The private hospital, with approximately 1,000 employees, provides emergency and 
intensive care to a mostly Hispanic population.2 In 2008 and 2009, TB rates in this 
geographic area were 10–12 cases per 100,000 population;3 the corresponding overall state 
and national rates were approximately 6 and 4 cases, respectively, per 100,000.4
Infection Control Policies at the Hospital
National guidelines recommend at least annual TB screening for healthcare workers who 
may encounter TB patients.1 In this hospital, employees who have direct contact with 
patients receive TB screening upon hire and then every 6 months. TB screening consists of 
an evaluation for signs and symptoms of TB disease and a TST. Employees with a 
documented positive TST result receive a TB symptom screen and, if symptoms are present, 
a chest radiograph and sputum examination.1
To prevent transmission of airborne infectious agents such as M. tuberculosis at this hospital, 
patients are screened upon admission, using a respiratory risk assessment tool. Questions 
include history of TB disease or infection, treatment, symptoms, and medical history. 
Persons with potentially infectious TB are placed in 1 of the hospital’s 8 airborne infection 
isolation rooms.1 When all isolation rooms are occupied, such patients are placed in a 
private room with a portable high-efficiency particulate air filtration unit.
Initial Investigation Focus
To validate the TST conversions and other newly positive TST results among hospital staff, 
the investigation in February 2010 assessed for changes in staff or techniques for TST 
placement and reading or changes in procedures for storing and handling the tuberculin 
antigen. Postexposure screening included use of different tests: TSTs and interferon-γ 
release assay (IGRA) blood tests. The ventilation systems of the airborne infection isolation 
rooms on the medical-surgical floor (floor X) were evaluated for potential malfunction.
The remaining purified protein derivative tuberculin (Tubersol, manufactured by Sanofi 
Pasteur) from the hospital was sent to the state public health laboratory to be analyzed for 
bacterial contamination. A nearby hospital using the same Tubersol lot numbers was asked 
whether TST results in their setting were unusual in any respect. In collaboration with a 
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university research laboratory, health department staff offered the first 30 hospital employees 
who had TST conversions or newly positive TST results a second test for M. tuberculosis 
infection, an IGRA.5
Expanded Investigation
Because most of the hospital staff with newly positive TST results had a documented 
negative result in August–September 2009 followed by a positive result in January–February 
2010, the March 2010 investigation focused on searching for exposure to infectious TB on 
floor X during September–December 2009.
Medical records were reviewed for evidence of undiagnosed TB for patients on floor X who 
had respiratory illnesses or TB risk factors, including incarcerated persons, those with 
human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) infection or other immunocompromising conditions, 
illicit drug users, and persons who were hospitalized for more than 2 weeks. Names of TB 
patients from local public health records were cross-referenced with the hospital’s patient 
database for any possible hospitalizations during their estimated infectious periods. 
Employees on floor X were asked if they could recall any coworkers who had symptoms or 
signs of TB at work (eg, severe coughing, weight loss).
In February 2010, a nurse working on floor X had a TST conversion and a chest radiograph, 
which indicated minimal interstitial infiltrates. Sputum specimens were collected, and smear 
results were negative for acid-fast bacilli. The nurse denied having symptoms, but several 
coworkers named the nurse as coughing at work for several months. In March, the sputum 
culture grew an isoniazid-monoresistant strain of M. tuberculosis. The genotype pattern of 
the nurse’s M. tuberculosis isolate was compared with genotype results of other persons 
diagnosed with TB in the county and adjacent counties.
RESULTS
TST application and reading techniques of the employee health nurse who administered the 
tests in January–February 2010 as well as during the previous 2 years were found to be 
acceptable, and no changes in the storing or handling of the antigen were discovered. The 
airborne infection isolation rooms on floor X met required ventilation standards. The public 
health laboratory found no evidence of bacterial contamination in the tuberculin used in the 
hospital. The manufacturer had no reports of adverse reactions with the same lot numbers, 
and no increase in the number of positive TST results were reported by the nearby hospital 
using the same antigen. Twenty-five staff with positive TST results were additionally tested 
with an IGRA (either QuantiFERON-TB Gold In-Tube or T-SPOT); 20 (80%) also had a 
positive IGRA result.
Because the floor X nurse diagnosed with TB disease had a history of consecutive negative 
TST results—most recently 4 months prior—and reported no symptoms, the nurse was 
considered an unlikely source for transmission. The nurse’s M. tuberculosis genotype did 
not match that of any persons with known TB diagnoses at the hospital in 2009. However, 
the M. tuberculosis strain had been found in 10 previous instances: 5 in this county, 2 in the 
rest of the state, and 3 others nationally.
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All 7 previous known TB disease occurrences in this state with this same M. tuberculosis 
genotype were also isoniazid monoresistant but were seen exclusively in Hispanic persons; 
the nurse was not Hispanic. The most recent matching M. tuberculosis genotype came from 
a Hispanic person (patient A) with cavitary TB in August 2009 in a nearby county jail. 
Despite careful reinterviewing to establish a link between the 2, the nurse was not found to 
have known contact with patient A, suggesting that an intervening transmission event might 
have linked the person in the jail to the hospital.
Further investigation revealed that in July 2009, patient A was arrested on the same day and 
time as another inmate (patient B), who was hospitalized and under the nurse’s care on floor 
X in October–November 2009. Jail records indicated that patient A and patient B arrived at 
the jail within 10 minutes of each other and were also transferred to general population 
within 10 minutes of each other. Records also indicated the possibility of the men sharing 
the same holding cell for about 10 hours before moving to general population; however, that 
could not be confirmed, because rosters of persons in holding cells are not kept at the jail.
In October 2009, patient B, a Spanish-speaking, HIV-infected man in his mid-20s, was 
admitted to floor X of this hospital from a county jail. He had cough, fever, chills, and 
weight loss, and his initial chest radiograph result showed bilateral infiltrates. His admitting 
diagnosis was community-acquired pneumonia. He was placed on antibiotics and 1 week 
later was discharged back to the jail. Two days after that, he was readmitted to the hospital 
with cough and fever. A portable air filtration system was ordered for his room initially but 
was removed after 1 day with the explanation that his pneumonia was not contagious. 
Patient B died 36 days later.
During his hospitalization, patient B had hemoptysis and a worsening chest radiograph. He 
had a documented history of drug use and homelessness. In 2007 at the same hospital, 
patient B had been treated under a different name for drug-susceptible TB and HIV/acquired 
immunodeficiency syndrome. His 2007 TB strain did not match that of patient A or of the 
nurse by either drug susceptibility (isoniazid mono-resistant) or M. tuberculosis genotype 
result.
Epidemiologic links between patients A and B and between patient B and the nurse—in 
addition to the matching M. tuberculosis genotypes of patient A and the nurse—led to the 
hypothesis that a first transmission wave occurred in July 2009 from patient A to patient B 
in the county jail. Although he had been treated for drug-susceptible TB in 2007, patient B 
may have been reinfected in 2009 with a different, isoniazid-monoresistant strain of TB. 
Because he was not under airborne infection isolation precautions on days 2–37 of his 2009 
hospitalization, patient B could have been the source of a second wave of transmission, 
explaining the large number of TST conversions and newly positive TST results among staff 
assigned to floor X.
On the basis of this new hypothesis, in April 2010, the county health department requested 
polymerase chain reaction–based nucleic acid amplification testing on a formalin-fixed 
esophageal tissue specimen collected from patient B during exploratory surgery of a neck 
abscess 2 days before his death. Testing was conducted at a research laboratory at the 
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University of Texas Health Science Center Houston, Brownsville campus, as described 
previously.6 Nucleic acid amplification test results demonstrated the presence of M. 
tuberculosis in the tissue. Neither culture confirmation nor genotype testing was possible on 
the nonviable sample.
Exposure to M. tuberculosis on Floor X
Interviews with hospital staff and visitors provided further insight into how M. tuberculosis 
transmission potentially occurred on floor X. Employees reported that during patient B’s 
hospitalization, he often walked the halls of floor X accompanied by correctional staff, 
allowing exposure to many persons, including other patients and visitors. Among hospital-
based contacts who were evaluated for TB infection, 23 (77%) of 30 floor X staff and 13 
(87%) of 15 correctional staff assigned to patient B had a positive result to either TST or 
IGRA following a negative TST result (Table 1).
In all, 416 (87%) of 477 hospital-based contacts were screened for M. tuberculosis infection; 
87 (27%) of the 318 contacts who did not have previous positive TST results were infected. 
Hospital employees with newly positive TB test results had 14 times the odds of working on 
floor X as compared with staff working in other areas of the hospital (odds ratio, 14.1 [95% 
confidence interval, 5.6–35.1]). Because of infection with M. tuberculosis that was 
presumably isoniazid monoresistant, persons with a positive TST or IGRA result were 
offered the 4-month regimen of rifampin after TB disease was excluded and if no 
contraindication to the medication was present.7
During March 2010 and March 2012, 9 persons who spent time on floor X were diagnosed 
with TB disease: 3 hospital employees (2 nurses and 1 social worker), 3 correctional 
officers, 2 visitors, and 1 patient. Seven had culture-positive pulmonary TB, and 2 had 
culture-negative clinically diagnosed pleural TB. Their ages ranged from 21 to 66 years old, 
with a mean age of 41 years. The average time from exposure to development of TB was 14 
months, with a range of 4–48 months.
The 7 persons with culture-positive TB all had M. tuberculosis genotyping results that 
matched patient A’s genotype and had isoniazid-monoresistant TB. Five had pulmonary TB 
only, and 2 had both pulmonary and extrapulmonary TB. All 9 were treated with a regimen 
for isoniazid-monoresistant TB and were clinically managed by staff at the local and 
regional health departments.
DISCUSSION
This investigation demonstrated M. tuberculosis transmission that began in a county jail and 
spread to a private hospital, where 1 missed TB diagnosis appeared responsible for 
infections in dozens of contacts and at least 9 new occurrences of TB disease. These findings 
are consistent with other studies reporting high TST conversion rates in institutions caring 
for many TB patients.8,9 A delay in the diagnosis of TB is a factor that has been associated 
with an increased risk of hospital-related transmission.10
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Because the hospital’s infection control program included routine TB screening of 
employees1 and baseline TST results were documented for the corrections staff,11 those who 
were recently infected were diagnosed within months of their exposure, allowing prompt 
notification and evaluation of other potentially exposed contacts.
Laboratory findings were essential to this investigation. M. tuberculosis genotyping and drug 
susceptibility results prompted the exploration of a link between the nurse and patient A. 
Although the 2 had no known direct contact with each other, they were connected indirectly 
by patient B, which ultimately led to the conclusion that patient B was the likely source for 
the M. tuberculosis transmission in the hospital. Drug susceptibility results were crucial for 
knowing how to treat the infected contacts.
The following limitations to these results should be recognized. The focus of this 
investigation was hospital transmission, so the true magnitude of this outbreak might be 
underestimated. For example, during the weeks leading up to his October 2009 
hospitalization, patient B might have exposed others to M. tuberculosis at the jail, where he 
had remained in general population for 3 months. The assumption that patient B was 
infected by patient A while in jail was based on the positive nucleic acid amplification test 
result and the epidemiological investigation. Prospective monitoring of M. tuberculosis drug 
susceptibility and genotype results will help elucidate whether transmission also occurred in 
the jail or community.
Collaborations such as the ones in this investigation between the hospital, local and state 
health departments, a university, and the correctional facility are essential to find and cure 
TB, which are the first priorities of TB control.1 To prevent future incidents, hospital and 
corrections staff should be mindful of suspecting TB in symptomatic persons, especially in 
those with risk factors for TB, such as HIV infection, a history of incarceration, 
homelessness, illicit drug use, or foreign-born background. Because the risk of progression 
of TB infection to TB disease is particularly high in recently infected persons,1,12 finding 
and promptly treating infected contacts is essential to preventing further transmission.
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